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Federalism, Separation of Powers, and
Individual Liberties*
I. INTRODUCTION: GOALS AND GOVERNMENT
We the People of the United States, in Order to . . .secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America.'
The Framers began the Constitution with this statement of
purpose because the philosophical tradition that spawned their po-
litical temperament viewed the preservation of liberty as the chief
objective of government.2 This tradition hypothesized that man,
prior to the formation of organized society, lived in a state of per-
fect freedom and equality.' In this state, all men possessed natural
liberty. According to William Blackstone, one of the eighteenth
century's most respected legal scholars, natural liberty consisted of
three absolute personal rights: (1). personal security, which "con-
sists in a person's .. .uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation;"4 (2) personal lib-
erty, which "consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing situ-
ation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own incli-
nation may direct; without imprisonment or restraint;' 5 and (3)
property, which "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal
of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution."'
Men possessed these rights in full measure, subject only to the
* This Essay was the winning entry for the Sixth Circuit in the National Bicentennial
Essay Competition for Law School Students. The competition was sponsored by the
Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution and West Publishing
Company. Participants were asked to write an essay on the question: "Does the Allocation
of Power Between the Federal and State Governments and Among the Branches of the
Federal Government Contribute to the Preservation of Individual Liberty and Functioning
of Our Government?" The author of this essay is a second-year student at Salmon P. Chase
College of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. preamble.
2. See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 124 (P. Laslett ed. 1952) (1st ed.
1690).
3. See id. 4.
4. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *129 (footnote
omitted).
5. Id. at *134.
6. Id. at *138 (footnote omitted).
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limitations of natural law, which provided that no person should
harm another in the exercise of his liberty.7 But natural law was
often honored more in the breach than the observance, which ren-
dered primeval existence uncertain and dangerous. In the state of
nature, the strong tended to dominate the weak. Self-aggrandize-
ment raged unchecked because of commonly accepted rules of con-
duct, impartial judges to interpret those rules, and police to en-
force these judicial interpretations." Therefore, men agreed to
surrender a portion of their natural liberty in order to secure a
greater measure of it through the protection of government.9 The
corollary of this theory was that if the government so formed failed
in its trust, if it destroyed the people's residuum of liberty, it put
itself "into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon ab-
solved from any further obedience." 10
The foregoing was merely an hypothesis. No empirical evi-
dence of such occurrences had ever been discovered. The Framers,
assembled in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787, converted
this theory into the foundation for the government of a republic of
four million persons. Most of them had been instrumental in
bringing this theory's corollary to pass; they had led the Nation in
a long and bloody war of independence from Great Britain. In jus-
tifying the war, they gave this theory its most succinct and elo-
quent expression:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Pow-
ers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Govern-
ment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter
or to abolish it, and to institute new Government.11
Having won its independence, the Nation, under the ineffec-
tual Articles of Confederation, reverted to a situation very much
like the chaotic state of nature. There was no commonly accepted
law or any power strong enough to check the unbridled self-ag-
grandizement of the states. Personal security and property were
threatened by hostile Indians to the west, hostile nations to the
east, and the likes of Daniel Shays within. The principal dilemma
facing the Framers was how to form a government strong enough
7. See J. LOCKE, supra note 2, 6.
8. See id. 124-26.
9. See id. 97.
10. See id. at 222.
11. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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to control these anarchical tendencies, but not strong enough to
threaten personal liberty. Their solution to this dilemma was to
grant the national government an impressive array of powers fully
adequate to maintain order, but to diffuse those powers in such a
way that no one sector of the government possessed enough power
to tyrannize the people. The two chief methods the Framers used
to allocate power have come to be known as federalism and the
separation of powers.
Federalism is the vertical allocation of power between the
states and the national government. Under this system, every per-
son is a citizen both of the state in which he or she resides and of
the nation as a whole. The laws of both centers of power operate
directly on the individual. The Nation's legislative power is divided
between the states and the central government, with each also pos-
sessing its own executive and judicial apparatus. The powers of the
national government are enumerated in the Constitution; those not
enumerated reside in the states. The law of the national govern-
ment, operating within its sphere of enumerated powers, is the su-
preme law of the land and preempts conflicting state law.
The separation of powers is the horizontal allocation of gov-
ernmental power within the states and the national government.
This concept recognizes, as did Aristotle and Montesquieu, three
distinct functions of government: legislative, executive, and judi-
cial. The gravamen of this doctrine is that those functions should
be exercised by separate, independent, and co-equal departments
in order to avoid dominance by any one over the others.
The Framers explained how this dual allocation of power oper-
ates to preserve liberty:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted
to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will con-
trol each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
12
The remainder of this Essay inquires whether the Framers
solved their dilemma satisfactorily-whether federalism and the
separation of powers have preserved individual liberty. Should
these allocations of power be found to preserve liberty effectively,
then it will necessarily follow that they contribute to the function-
ing of our government. Many have complained that federalism and
the separation of powers duplicate governmental efforts unnecessa-
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 325 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
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rily, rendering our government contentious, slow to respond to cri-
ses, and inefficient. The Constitution, however, "recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency."13 If these principles preserve in-
dividual liberty, they do far more than merely aid the functioning
of our government-they justify its very existence.
II. FEDERALISM AS A PROTECTOR OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
In the American republics the central government has never as yet busied
itself except with a small number of objects, sufficiently prominent to attract
its attention.. . . When the central government which represents the major-
ity has issued a decree, it must entrust the execution of its will to agents over
whom it frequently has no control and whom it cannot perpetually direct.
The townships, municipal bodies, and counties form so many concealed
breakwaters which check or part the tide of popular determination. If an op-
pressive law were passed, liberty would still be protected by the mode of exe-
cuting that law.
14
The major threat to individual liberty was seen as abuse of the
legislative process. A tyrannical majority, it was feared, might use
acts of Congress to divest the states and the states' residents of
their rights. The major bulwarks against such tyranny were the
narrow scope of the national government's powers and the broad
authority the states still retained. Therefore, the Bill of Rights,
which contained a much more comprehensive enumeration of indi-
vidual liberties than those enunciated by Blackstone, limited only
the actions of the national government and did not apply to the
states.15 The scope of state sovereignty encompassed "the same un-
deniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things,
within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation, where that juris-
diction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the
United States."''  In such a milieu, the states, as the Framers had
expected, 17 served as the primary forum for the vindication of indi-
vidual liberty.
Excepting the rare occasions when a state law was invalidated
because it was determined to have infringed on a vested right pro-
tected by the contracts clause,1 8 this state of affairs prevailed into
13. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
14. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOcRACY IN AMERICA 271-72 (F. Bowen rev. ed. 1945).
15. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet. ) 243, 250-51 (1833).
16. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837).
17. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 290 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (stating that
"[tihe powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people").




the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Even the broad lan-
guage of the fourteenth amendment was, at first, given a narrow
construction that did not prevent the states from enacting legisla-
tion affecting the lives, liberty, and property of their citizens. 19
This situation did not last. By the end of the century, the fed-
eral judiciary began to employ the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to overturn social and economic regulations en-
acted by the states.20 These substantive due process cases involved
the conflict of two of Blackstone's absolute rights-personal secur-
ity and property. Whereas the states enacted legislation to protect
the personal security of their citizens, the Constitution was inter-
preted to preclude them from doing so when the property rights of
regulated corporations were abridged.
The Great Depression, however, generated a belief that strong
social and economic measures were necessary and permissible.
Faced with President Franklin Roosevelt's threat to upset the sep-
aration of powers by "packing" the Supreme Court, the federal
bench abandoned this unpopular line of cases. 21 This seeming tri-
umph of state power was heralded as a victory for yet another ben-
efit of federalism: "It is one of the happy incidents of our federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.
'2 2
This reemergence of state power did not cause a return to un-
bridled state power. The Nation had grown into a continental eco-
nomic unit. Advances in transportation and communications de-
manded uniform national regulations. The central government
could no longer be concerned with a "small number of objects suffi-
ciently prominent to attract its attention. 2 3 The federal judiciary,
having abandoned strict scrutiny of state social and economic leg-
islation, did not abandon review of state legislation under the four-
teenth amendment. Recognizing the homogenizing tendencies re-
sulting from the growing mobility of our citizens and the growing
standardization of our industrial society, the Supreme Court dis-
cerned a new tyrannical majority. This was not the unpropertied
mass that troubled the Framers, but rather millions of upstanding,
middle-class citizens whom the Court feared might impose an op-
19. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
20. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
21. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
22. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 14, at 271.
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pressive conformity on society's disadvantaged and its dissenters.
The Court, therefore, began to redefine personal liberty, giving it a
broader scope and applying it uniformly throughout the Nation.
Provisions of the Bill of Rights, found to be "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty," ' were incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and thus immunized from
state abridgement.25 New "penumbral rights" were recognized and
protected, including the right to vote, 6 the right of interstate
travel,27 the right of privacy, 2  freedom of association,2 9 and free-
dom of personal choice in matters concerning family life.30 The
equal protection clause was interpreted to prohibit not only dis-
crimination based on race,"1 but also certain kinds of discrimina-
tion based on sex,3 2 illegitimacy,33 and alienage.
3 4
The Supreme Court did not act alone in forging this new na-
tional standard of personal liberty. Congress, with its already
broad commerce powers supplemented by the affection and aggre-
24. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
25. The following provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
First Amendment Rights: Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment
clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause); De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly and petition); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of
speech).
Fourth Amendment Rights: Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures).
Fifth Amendment Rights: Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (collateral estoppel);
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (self-incrimination).
Sixth Amendment Rights: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury
trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965) (confrontation clause); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (right to an impartial jury); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (right to a public trial and notice).
Eighth Amendment Rights: Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
(cruel and unusual punishments clause).
26. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1965).
27. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (recognizing right to privacy in child bearing decisions); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971) (recognizing right to privacy in marital decisions).
29. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
30. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
31. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 294 (1954).
32. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 429 U.S. 71 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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gation doctrines, began to employ those powers to promote its own
conception of personal liberty. 5 Using both its commerce power
and its taxing and spending power, Congress has attached condi-
tions to state receipt of federal grants-in-aid. These conditions
have created enforceable individual rights to state services funded
by those grants, which the poor, the illiterate, and the handicapped
have pursued in the courts. 6
Individual liberty, as presently understood, would hardly be
recognizable to the Framers. The virtually exclusive champion of
this new liberty has been the national government. This point is
clearly illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.3 7 The State of New York, through its
Human Rights Law," sought to serve as a laboratory by ensuring
more comprehensive employee benefits to pregnant workers than
would have been available under The Civil Rights Act of 1964."9
The Court held that those provisions were preempted by ERISA,
which had incorporated the Civil Rights Act's standards.4 0 Thus,
Congress, acting pursuant to its commerce power, can place a limit
on the rights a state may grant its citizens. In this case, the bound-
ary line for New York's enhancement of its residents' personal se-
curity was drawn at the property rights of multistate corporations.
The Court stated that "[a]n employer with employees in several
States would find its [disability] plan subject to a different juris-
dictional pattern of regulation in each State, depending on what
benefits the State mandated."41
Unquestionably, individual liberty is being preserved in
1987-but is it being preserved by federalism? Many commenta-
tors have suggested that state power actually diminishes liberty.4 s
Others fear that recent decisions will "relegate the States to pre-
cisely the trivial role that opponents of the Constitution feared
they would occupy.
' 4'
35. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
36. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 930-31 (1985).
37. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
38. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987).
39. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88. The Court had held that discrimination based on pregnancy
did not constitute sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
40. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 109.
41. Id. at 107.
42. Neuman, Federalism and Freedom: A Critique, in THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
ARENA: SELECTED READINGS 7 (J. Fiszman ed. 1966).




Despite the decline of state power, recent Supreme Court deci-
sions indicate that the states still play an important role in pre-
serving individual liberty-not the expanded liberty of selective in-
corporation, penumbral rights, and federal entitlements, but rather
the core liberties that the Framers first entrusted to their care. In
Heath v. Alabama,4 for example, the state's right to protect its
citizens' personal security against crime prevailed over a criminal's
double jeopardy defense.45 The Court noted that a state's power to
"undertake criminal prosecutions derive from separate and inde-
pendent sources of power and authority originally belonging to
them before admission to the Union and preserved to them by the
Tenth Amendment. 4 6 In Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc.47 county regulations concerning blood
plasma donors, which were stricter than Federal Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) standards, were held not to be preempted by the fed-
eral regulations.48 In reaching this decision, the Court relied on
"the presumption that state or local regulation of matters related
to health and safety is not invalidated under the Supremacy
Clause. ' 49 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.50
the Court allowed the State of Washington to protect a citizen's
reputational interest by awarding punitive damages for negligent
defamation resulting from the defendant's issuance of a false credit
report.51
The Court relies on federalism to secure individual rights in
certain cases in which it defers to the inherent'powers and superior
factfinding ability of the state legislature. Hawaii Housing Author-
ity v. Midkiff 2 involved a state's use of its power of eminent do-
main to redistribute property held by a few large landowners to a
large number of potential homeowners.53 In upholding the state's
authority to redistribute property, the Court analogized Hawaii's
situation to that faced by the former colonies after the American
Revolution.54 The Court then stated that, "[riegulating oligopoly
44. 106 S. Ct. 433 (1985).
45. Id. at 440.
46. Id. at 438.
47. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
48. Id. at 716.
49. Id. at 715.
50. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
51. Id. at 763.
52. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
53. Id. at 232-34.
54. Id. at 241-42 (footnote omitted).
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and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's
police powers. ' 55 This case represents federalism in its most pris-
tine form. The state, dealing with problems peculiar to its own citi-
zens, enacts legislation to advance one of the absolute personal
rights of the individual-the right to hold property. The Hawaiian
oligopolists, like the savages who first forsook the state of nature to
form a government, were forced to surrender a part of their own
liberty for the greater protection of everyone's liberty.56
The allocation of power between the state and federal govern-
ments may protect individual liberty better today than it did in
the early years of the republic. Although the federal government
has provided new fora for the vindication of an ever expanding
concept of liberty, the states still retain ample powers to protect
the original liberty envisioned by the Framers.
III. SEPARATION OF POWER AS A PROTECTOR OF INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTY
The Constitution, in distributing the powers of government, creates three dis-
tinct and separate departments.. . . This separation is not merely a matter
of convenience or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital,
namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of
government in the same hands. 57
To the Framers such a commingling of powers constituted
"the very definition of tyranny. 5 8 To guard against this tyranny,
they rejected a specific constitutional provision mandating a sepa-
ration of powers and chose to create a government with a structure
incapable of concentrating too much power in the hands of any one
branch.
Originally, Congress was considered to be the department
against whose "enterprising ambition . . . the people ought to in-
dulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.519 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court has often struck down statutes that
constituted impermissible legislative incursions into the executive
sphere.60
In recent years, however, much has been made of the self-ag-
55. Id. at 242.
56. See J. LOCKE, supra note 2.
57. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (citation omitted).
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
59. Id. No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison).




grandizing tendencies of the executive and judicial branches. The
growth of executive power since the New Deal has led many to fear
an "Imperial Presidency." Despite this growth, there was sufficient
strength in the judicial branch to block President Truman's at-
tempt to exercise legislative powers against the steel companies."
The Court again asserted its strength in United States v. Nixon,62
a case in which President Nixon claimed absolute privilege and de-
fied a district court subpoena by refusing to reveal the contents of
certain private communications.6 In rejecting the President's
claim, the Court stated, "The impediment that an absolute, un-
qualified privilege would place in the way of the primary constitu-
tional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prose-
cutions would plainly conflict with the functions of the courts
under Art[icle] III."64
The natural litigiousness of Americans, coupled with the ever
increasing number of laws and lawyers, has prompted many to as-
sert that the courts are threatening to become "super legislatures."
While judicial activism is undoubtedly high, the bench still man-
ages to exercise a significant degree of restraint when incursions
into the prerogatives of the coordinate branches are involved. For
several years, the courts have deferred to legislative determinations
in cases involving social and economic legislation. 5 During the Vi-
etnam Era, for example, the Supreme Court regularly declined to
review lower court determinations that actions challenging the le-
gality of the war constituted nonjusticiable political controver-
sies. 6 The courts also maintain the separation of powers through
the doctrine of standing, which requires plaintiffs who challenge a
governmental action to be harmed directly thereby. To hold other-
wise would "pave the way generally for suits challenging, not spe-
cifically identifiable governmental violations of law, but the partic-
ular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal
obligations.
' '6 7
Because the separation of powers doctrine operates to protect
individual liberties on a systemic level, many cases in this area
61. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952).
62. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
63. Id. at 703.
64. Id. at 707.
65. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
66. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
67. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984). This judicial restraint may become more
prevalent in the future. See Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881 (1983).
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tend to be abstract. Threats to individual liberty are not as dra-
matically presented because the whole purpose of the doctrine is to
check the inordinate growth of a governmental department's power
before it becomes sufficiently large to pose a dramatic threat. How-
ever, INS v. Chadha 8 illustrates how the separation of powers
doctrine preserves individual liberty. Chadha involved an alien's
challenge to provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act69
that allowed the House of Representatives to veto the United
States Attorney General's suspension of his deportation."° While
the majority decision focused on the constitutionality of the legis-
lative veto, Justice Powell's concurring opinion saw the Act as al-
lowing an unconstitutional assumption of judicial powers by Con-
gress. 1 In his concurrence, he thoroughly catalogued the ways in
which the Act had deprived Chadha of his rights. Justice Powell
argued that the House's ability to veto the suspension of a depor-
tation order could deny an individual a fair hearing. Congress was
not bound by any substantive criteria of the statute or any proce-
dural rules. An individual's rights, therefore, would be contingent
on the whim of the majority.
7 2
IV. CONCLUSION
In a world that the Framers hardly could have anticipated, the
Constitution remains a singularly effective instrument for the pres-
ervation of individual liberty. In its allocation of power between
the states and the federal government, it provides Americans with
multiple champions of their rights-the federal government, which
protects a liberty that is constantly evolving to adapt traditional
68. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
69. 66 Stat. 216, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
70. Id. at 928.
71. Id. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 966. Justice Powell stated:
The impropriety of the House's assumption of this function is confirmed by the fact
that its action raises the very danger that the framers sought to avoid-the exercise of
unchecked power. In deciding whether Chadha deserves to be deported, Congress is not
subject to any internal constraints that prevent it from arbitrarily depriving him of the
right to remain in this country. Unlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Con-
gress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural
safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that
are present when a court or an agency adjudicates individual rights. The only effective
constraint on Congress' power is political, but Congress is most accountable politically
when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific per-
sons, those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a shifting majority."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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values to new realities, and the state governments, which protect
the basic liberties to which mankind has always been entitled.
In its allocation of power between the branches of the federal
government, the Constitution provides us with a polity possessing
powers adequate to provide for our security and prosperity. Yet
these powers are sufficiently diffused to pose no irresistible threat
to individual liberty. In protecting liberty, the Constitution contin-
ues to legitimize itself as a compact for the governance of a free
people.
DENNIS G. LAGORY
